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Explanatory Note
On March 16, 1971, the National Academy of Engineering convened the Forum
of the Committee on Power Plant Siting (COPPS) in Washington, D.C. After two days of
plenary sessions the members of the three main working groups met for three days to
begin drafting their reports. Four of the authors of the present report (Borrelli,
Easterling, Lees and Poppe) constituted the sub-group on Environmental Aspects of Siting
of Working Group II-Systems Approach to Site Selection. Intensive discussions in
Washington in this sub-group, and the subsequent exchange of draft sections by mail,
convinced us that we should go far beyond our original assignment and probe into all
aspects of power plant siting, especially the public interest factors. During a second
intensive working session in Pasadena, California, on April 22 and 23, 1971, we were
joined by Guy Pauker and Burton H. Klein, who also participated in the subsequent
redrafting of the final report.
We are grateful to the NAE-COPPS for stimulating our thinking on this important
and difficult problem. However, the final report is solely our responsibility as individuals
and the responsibility of the Caltech Environmental Quality Laboratory.
Lester Lees
Director, Environmental Quality Laboratory
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CONaUSIONS:
1. We are beginning to 'deal with the environmental damage caused by our rapidly
increasing demand for electricity. But the environmental problems we have now are small
compared to those we will face in the future if we continue to generate electricity at the
present rate of increase. It has been suggested that the growth rate of electric power
consumption must be curtailed. There is some indication that the rate of increase will, in
fact, slacken. Yet, even assuming near zero population growth, a drop to one half the
present rate of growth in individual wealth, and a corresponding 50 percent reduction in the
current rate of increase in power use in the next decade, U.S. consumption of electricity
will still triple by 1990.
At a time when there is scarcely a place in the country where a power plant can
be built and operated without public opposition, we must plan sites for three times more
electric generating capacity than we now have.
2. Social values of Americans are changing. The growing consumption of electric
power comes into direct conflict with the insistent and increasing public demand for a
better environment and more careful attention to other public interests in private
decisions.
Systems engineers who design power plants and select sites for them can no
longer consider only traditional technical and economic factors. They must give equal
weight to public interest factors from the very beginning of the engineering process. The
cost of failing to do so will be lengthy delays in legal actions and very probably more
frequent power shortages in the near future. Yet the traditional engineering goals of
supplying enough electricity at the cheapest possible price cannot be abandoned:
environmental factors will increase the cost of power but the increase must be kept to a
minimum.
3. How do power plant planners take public interest factors into account? How
are these factors identified? The answer is that planning must be opened to the public;
the public must be involved in new forums of participative decision-making. And utilities
must come to these forums recognizing their validity and freely surrendering the
prerogative of unilateral decision-making. This, however, leaves the. central question of
who "the public" is, and who effectively speaks for the public. As to this, there is no
general theory. The answer varies from place to place and conflict to conflict. Ho~ever,
5
recent successful attempts to involve the public seem to have the following
characteristics:
a. Citizen groups are brought in before, not after, the major decisions have been
made.
b. Utilities are completely open to public discussion and accept the input of
any interested party, no matter how "extreme."
c. Utilities fully disclose all information felt by public spokesmen to be relevant
to the issues.
d. All sides actively seek means to resolve the conflict.
e. All sides regard adversary proceedings-court actions-as the last resort-to be
used only when all other methods of conflict-resolution have failed.
4. A system of governmental air and water quality regulation is developing in the
nation based on three distinct kinds of goals: (1) ambient air and water quality standards,
which are long-term national goals established considering only the levels of pollutants
which must not be exceeded to assure the health and welfare of the people; (2)
management air and water quality standards, which are a series of steps toward the
long-term goals that are determined by technical and economic feasibility at a particular
time in a geographic region; (3) emission standards, which are used for regulation of
pollution sources in order to implement the goals set out in the management standards
and, ultimately, the ambient standards.
This is a practical system, but it will work only if management standards are
accepted by both utilities and the public as concrete milestones on the way to an
acceptable environment; and ambient standards are understood to be long-term, but
realistic, goals.
.5. While institutions have been developing for the resolution of conflicts between
public an~ private interests in the use of air and water, the same has not been happening
for land and natural resources. Much of the opposition to specific power plants has
concerned land use rather than pollution. There is no overall system for considering the
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best use of land in the broadest environmental and economic contexts. The situation is
similar-if not worse-for the allocation of natural resources, particularly energy resources.
In some cases, the use of a particular clean fuel might make the difference between an
acceptable and unacceptable power plant. Yet no method presently exists for allocating
fuels to various users in an environmentally efficient way.
6. The electric power industry will invest $250 biilion in power generating
equipment during the next two decades. Traditionally, the industry has relied on its
suppliers for development of better ways to generate and distribute electricity. The result
has been an underdeveloped technology for meeting the demands imposed on the
industry by the new requirements for increased power with minimum environmental
damage. Areas in which research is needed are: (1) development of new energy sources, such
as solar energy conversion; (b) control of emissions from fossil-fuel burning plants; (c)
development of beneficial uses of waste heat, such as mariculture; (d) reduction or
elimination of radiation hazards; (e) development of novel methods of power plant siting,
such as off-shore and underground.
A new mechanism-perhaps a federal agency or a private organization financed by
the power industry-must be created to carry out a major industry-wide research and
development program. Whether the mechanism is public or private, the costs should be
assessed against the users of electricity, in proportion to their consumption.
7

RECOMMENDATIONS.'
1. OPEN PLANNING INSTEAD OF PRIVATE PLANNING: The public interest in the
environment is as important as the traditional economic and technical considerations that
usually determine the design and location of power plants. Utilities should, therefore,
admit all spokesmen for the public interest, no matter how "extreme," to the power
plant planning process from the very beginning. The courts should be the last resort, not
the first opportunity for the public to be heard.
2. PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES: Effective
methods for mediating conflict over the use of air and water are evolving-but there are
no institutions for articulating the public interest in private decisions about the use of
land and natural resources. Such institutions must be created, and the need is especially
great in the case of power plant siting.
3. A MASSIVE ENERGY EFFORT: Present research and development of the power
industry is totally inadequate, considering both .the amount of energy this country uses
and the urgency of the need for cleaner and more efficient technology. So much
electricity is being used in the United States today that a tax or charge of only one-half a
mill (one-twentieth of a cent) per kilowatt hour could raise three quarters of a billion dollars
a year for an accelerated program of government or industry-sponsored research. Such a
program should be undertaken without delay.
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1. Introduction: Societal Demands, Constraints and Choices
1.1 Growth in Electrical Energy Demand
Forecasts of future electric power demand usually amount to linear extrapolations
of past history on a semi-log plot-the "exponential growth syndrome" of modern industrial
society. Can we identify sociological values that could lead to a gradual reduction of the rate
of growth in the demand for electrical energy over the next ten to twenty years? This
question is under intensive study by many groups; here we list only a few major factors that
might lead to a 'slowdown" in the rate of growth of electric power consumption per capita:
(a) Shift from single-family homes to multiple dwellings in new residential
construction. (A single family apartment uses about 2/3 of the electric power
consumption of a single family home).
(b) Increase in mobile homes as a percentage of new residences, especially in the
price range below $18,000.
(c) Slowdown in the rate of growth of the labor force over the next 20 years.
(d) Reduction in number of hours in the work week.
(e) Shift in labor force from manufacturing to less power-intensive service and trade
occupations.
(f) Increase in electric power rates (in 1971 dollars) caused by increasing fuel costs,
and by new methods of power plant siting and waste heat management dictated
by environmental constraints.
Of course, growth-stiml,llating factors can also be identified; some examples are as
follows:
(i) increase in productivity per worker in manufacturing, leading to a growth in real
income per capita, and a growth in demand for everything, including electric
power
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(ii) climate control (winter and summer) for houses, patios and public places
(iii) urban public transportation (electric) and electric automobiles
Suppose that the factors pushing in the direction of a slowdown in the rate of
increase of electric power demand should win out; what would the impact be'( In order to
throw some light on this question we have chosen a highly simplified "minimum growth"
model with a single "time constant," in which the equivalent exponential growth rate in per
capita demand drops from its present value of 6.8%/year to one-half of this value in about
10 years, and gradually approaches a constant value of 2%/year. The results are shown by
the curves labelled 2 in the attached Figure (taking the State of California as an example).
In 1970 the per capita demand for electric power (Ep ) in California was 1260
watts/person; according to the projection represented by curve 2, Ep will increase to 2600
watts/person by 1990, and to 4120 watts/person by the year 2010, or about 3.3 times
present per capita demand. (The numerals along this curve denote the "local" equivalent
exponential growth rate). By comparison a projected "Maximum" growth rate in Ep of
6%/year in the period 1970-1990, and 5.5%/year in the period 1990-2010, leads to values of
Ep of 4150 watts/person by 1990 and to 12,500 watts/person by the year 2010 [curve 1 ].
During this same period the projected growth in population plays a secondary role
compared to the differences in these two projections of Ep. The population growth rate was
about 1.5%/year in 1970, and the rate is projected to drop to about one-half of the value by
1990, and to zero by the year 2010 (see Figure).
One of the most striking conclusions to be drawn from the Figure is that the
projected electric power demand (E) ten years hence given by curve 2 is only slightly lower
than the demand shown by curve 1, even though the rate of growth in Ep falls to one-half
of its present value by that time. As Dr. Burton Klein of Caltech has pointed out, if we
wanted to influence demand in 1980 we should have started controlling the rate of increase
in Ep in 1960. By the same argument, if the curve of Ep vs. time does not start "bending
over" until 1980, electric power demand in 1990 will be just about as large as predicted by
curve 1, and a significant effect on demand would not appear until the year 2000.
Even the "minimum growth rate" projection il~ustrated by curve 2 calls for an
almost threefold increase in electric power demand in t~e State of California by the year
1990. Because of their cumulative effect, small unpredictable increases in growth rate above
those shown along curve 2 for Ep would lead to an even larger power demand 20 years
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hence. By comparison the "maximum growth" projection [curve 1 ] shows a 4.6-fold
increase in electric power demand by 1990. Allowing for increased imports of electric power
from outside the state, and for the planned enlargement of generating capacity at existing
sites, 14 new plants of 4000 MW(e) each would by required by 1990, according to curve 1 .
These considerations show that we need to develop a long-range (40-year) electric power
plant siting plan that is flexible enough to cope with uncertainties, without provoking a new
environmental "crisis" every 7 or 8 years.
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1.2 The Systems Engineer and Societal Constraints and Choices
The growing demand for electric power (Section 1.1) comes into direct conflict with
the insistent and growing public demand for substantial improvement in environmental
quality and careful attention to other public interests. In order to resolve this conflict the
basic premise of good systems engineering as applied to power plant design and siting will
have to change in a fundamental way. Minimizing adverse effects on the environment and
providing for the energy needs of society must now be regarded as co-equal objectives right
from the beginning. Public acceptability and related political considerations are no longer
"external" factors. Although the engineer may sometimes regard such considerations as
"irrational", they are often powerful and even decisive, and they need to be included in any
generalized systems analysis that is supposed to deal with the total problem.
The systems engineer today is confronted by a set of societal "vector forces"
pushing in different directions, and he has the challenging and difficult task of working out
a balanced solution (Section 2). Public and private utilities have usually insisted that no
constraints should be placed on their operations unless it can be clearly demonstrated that
these operations produce a definite, measurable adverse effect on the environment. On the
other hand, most environmentalists insist that an action should not be permitted if there is
even a small chance that it will produce harmful, irreversible effects on the environment.
These two opposing points of view often present a severe problem to the engineer, who may
not have sufficient "hard information" to know the effect of a prospective action and who
may not have time to wait for the results of a long-range research program. In the resolution
of such a dilemma "dynamic factors" can be decisive; for example, the predictable steady
reduction with time in the permissible levels of sulfur dioxide and particulate emissions, or
in the allowable temperature excess above ambient of thermal discharges into natural bodies
of water. (See Appendix A) When all factors are considered, it may be more helpful to
society (and even less costly) to select a closed-cycle cooling system than to wage a long
legal battle against restrictions on thermal discharges.
In arriving at a balanced solution the systems engineer may find it imperative to
involve working groups of volunteer environmentalists and other public interest groups in
the planning operation from the outset. The obvious risks of such "open planning" (Section
2) are often outweighed by the fresh thinking of concerned citizens and by the benefits of
exposing an important, activist segment of society to the hard choices that we all face. Of
course if this process is to be meaningful the systems engineer needs to keep open a wide
range of possible choices of fuels, plant sites and waste heat management schemes, and not
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foreclose certain alternatives zn advance because of relatively narrow (within 10%) cost
considerations.
The objective is to do the best possible job of minimizing the adverse environmental
impact of power generation and transmission, and let the public decide when the additional
costs of additional reductions in environmental impact are too large. The rate-setting
mechanism provides a built-in method of "internalizing" the costs. It could also be designed
to provide incentives to develop beneficial uses of waste heat, such as biochemical treatment
of sewage, mariculture, etc., and incentives for multiple uses of the land around power
plants and under transmission lines. At any rate the process of determining what the public
will pay for electrical energy under environmental constraints is necessarily iterative and
experimental at present. Perhaps experience and a better understanding of complex
environmental interactions will permit some relaxation of "standards" in the future, but in
the meantime the "better-safe-than-sorry" approach has much to recommend it, especially
when we recall the history of "smog", eutrophication, mercury poisoning and other
environmental disasters. This position of the environmentalists is now being enforced by
legal and political actions.
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1.3 Decision Making During a Period of Paradigm Change
There are three kinds of decision-making processes that are of interest here. The first
IS aimed at static efficiency; the combination of more or less known inputs in a way to
minimize costs and to maximize profits. This kind of decision-making, and the highly static
systems engineering approach which goes with it, has been characteristic of the electric
power industry in the past. In the second kind of decision-making process the aim is a high
degree of dynamic efficiency; the combination of new scientific and technological ideas to
produce a new menu of technology. This kind of decision-making and the highly dynamic
systems approach which goes with it is characteristic of the planning and organization of
Bell Telephone Laboratories. The third kind of decision-making is decision-making in the
face of paradigm changes, when new fundamental assumptions enter the picture. In science
such revolutionary periods characterized the change from the Ptolemaic to the Copernican
world-view in astronomy, or from the Newtonian to the Einsteinian universe in physics. The
contemporary systems engineer must now adjust his thinking to a world in which private
interest considerations, expressed by concern with economic and technological efficiency,
will have to be reconciled increasingly with public interest considerations of
environmental management. The systems engineer sensitive to such paradigm changes will
attempt to resolve potentially dangerous social conflicts in a relatively peaceful and
democratic way; and thereby to pave the way for a new regime of dynamic and later,
static efficiency. This kind of decision-making was characteristic of the way many labor
disputes were resolved at an earlier part of our history. And it is also characteristic of the
way politicians like La Guardia went about dealing with social conflicts. The general aim
in such conflict resolution is to substitute the doctrine of pragmatism for high
"principles".
Though the proponents of each of these three kinds of decision-making processes
believe that theirs is the "right" way, and right for all periods of history, all of them can
be the right way of making decisions, or the wrong way of making decisions, depending
on the period of history in question. For example, it certainly must be acknowledged
that the long hard fight on the part of the electric power industry to keep costs down
has had something to do with the high productivity of this country; just as it must be
acknowledged that the sense of excitement and adventure which has characterized BTL's
efforts had something to do with realizing its long-term goal, which from the beginning
was to provide the U.S. with a cheap and reliable telecommunications system.
On the other hand, there are periods of history when neither of the first two
19
decision-making processes will work. In general, they are the periods of history when it is
necessary to change course to make a new kind of history. And it is such a period of
history that we are in now-a period in which new kinds of paradigms must be evolved.
The principal characteristic of such periods is the kinds of uncertainties involved. Not
only are there scientific and technological uncertainties-uncertainties about how to get
the job done-which are quite as great as those faced by BTL in say, 1920; but there is
also a good deal of uncertainty as to what the job is. For example, some of the power
companies believe that the job is to continue to produce power at the lowest possible
cost, and to take environmental constraints into account only insofar as damage can be
clearly demonstrated. On the other hand, the ecology movement contains some
extremists who, in their great desire to preserve the natural environment, almost do not
care what happens to man. He is admonished to renounce the values of modern society,
and to adopt, forthwith, the values associated with medieval asceticism Moreover, as
happens in all periods of crisis, there are those who see in them an opportunity to sell
their "pet" schemes. In particular, coalitions of engineers are now forming to sell their
technological dreams. Many of them accept the "Earth is a Spaceship" concept but want
Noah's Ark to be outfitted in the most up-to-date technology. Their motto, in other
words, is that if we must have "zero growth", let's have it in high technological style.
The general idea of open planning is to try to define the job in a way that will
avoid any of these extremes. To do this, the various extremist groups (including the
technological "fix" types) must engage in serious conflicts, for without such conflicts,
paradigm change never can come about. On the other hand, the satisfactory resolution of
such conflicts requires people who, unlike the authors of this paper, do not have an axe
to grind. For example, when it comes to resolving such conflicts, the average woman
probably has much more sense than any engineer, environmentalist, or economist.
In brief, then, decision-making during periods of paradigm changes is very stormy
business, the outcome of which no one can guarantee. And the only thing which really
can be said for open planning, which is really an attempt to revive the kind of town hall
planning which worked so well in former periods of this country's history, is simply that
there is no alternative in sight which is guaranteed to work better. No one likes stormy
history, but unless a way is found to resolve serious conflicts, there is no way to get on
with the business of making a new kind of history.
One can state only the general objective of such open planning. The objective is
not simply to find a way to resolve conflicts-to form new alliances between two groups
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which would resolve their conflicts at the expense of a third group. It would be easy, for
example, to contrive a scheme which satisfied the interests of conservationists for
preserving the environment but which left other segments of society out of account
altogether. It would be easy to forget, in other words, that the ecology crisis is not the
only crisis facing this country. The aim therefore, must be to take into account a variety
of interests in the best way possible-remembering, of course, that some degree of
sacrifice will be required all around. On the other hand, the aim must be to help
minimize the degree of sacrifices. For example, ways have to be found to assure that to
the extent environmental factors are taken into account in power plant siting, they are
taken into account in the least costly manner. And ways have to be found that permit
standards to be worked out in a pragmatic way and which will take into account the
difficulty of meeting them. Finally, ways have to be found to produce a good deal of
rapid feedback, so all concerned can learn from each other's experience.
In Section 2 the practice of this new systems engineering, including "open
planning", is examined in more detail. Section 3 deals with some illustrative case histories
of conflict and resolution involving air quality, water quality and thermal discharge, and
aesthetics and land use, and Section 4 examines briefly the economic aspects of
environmental constraints on power plant siting. In Section 5 we treat the problem of
regulation and standards. Section 6 discusses the unresolved national problem of
organizing and stimulating the required development and research on reduction In
emissions, novel methods of power plant siting, new energy sources, etc. Finally, In
Section 7 we examine the long-term prospects for power plant siting and power
generation in the post-1985 time period.
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2. Open PJanning and Social Forces
2.1 Introduction
The development of a systems engineering approach to environmental problem
solving, and specifically the siting of future power generating facilities is not a new
process pertaining to this area of concern. Systems engineering has been used by most
utilities in the past in selecting and developing sites for power facilities and yet, this
process has resulted in conflict and delays. New problem solving and decision-making
mechanisms are needed which will enable utilities to site future facilities which are in
keeping with the environmental, social and political needs of the public.
What can produce workable solutions? A broader perspective is the key, together
with a forum which encourages, if not requires, that perspective. This perspective must be
brought to new or restructured forums-eventually, these will be primarily governmental.
What will be the nature of these new forums? That will probably be determined
more than anything else, by the failure by one level of government to deal effectively
with the problems in a timely way which will cause them to go by default to another
level. The temper of the times will not permit the problems to go unsolved.
These new governmental forums eventually must look to regional problem-solving
which ignores the unrealities of political boundaries. However, a regional approach will be
a long time coming. Local and state's Tights is a concept too dearly held at the present
time.
It is often suggested by electric industry representatives that what is really needed
IS more government, more regulation, i.e., just tell us what the rules are and we will obey
them. While more regulation is probably what is going to happen, it is not a complete
solution. There is, to be sure, a compelling need for some order and rules-both
procedural and substantive-upon which industry can rely. However, a call by industry
for governmental regulation-whether state or federal-must never be a substitute for
individual corporate responsibility. The end result of this approach for corporations is
only to place some of the real management opportunities in the hands of a political
body. These remarks should not be taken as a polemic against government regulation.
Corporations must always recognize that the letter of the law is but the beginning and
not the end of corporate response.
25
2.2 Involving the Public
The really crying need is to give prime attention to establishment of new forums
which allow room for participative decision-making. Utilities must come to these forums
recognizing their validity, and freely surrendering the prerogative of unilateral
decision-making.
There are several new ways for industry to think about environmental problems.
To those industries such as utilities which are heavily involved in environmental matters,
there is one keystone proposition which must be understood and accepted.
The basic problem lies with the fact that utilities make internal judgements based
on their evaluations of economics and operational needs-although increasingly tempered
in recent times by their interpretation of the public will. While that basic process is
obviously valid and must continue, it has one fundamental weakness. The "public"
(however one may choose to define it) does not have an opportunity to participate until
after the decision is made and after the point of no return is passed. Many institutions
are finding that this procedure is no longer acceptable, e.g., universities, the organized
church, government.
The unacceptability of this "institutionalized decision-making" focuses most
sharply on those areas where the public feels it is most intimately involved. Thus, students
and faculty feel they ought to have a larger role in university policy formation. Utility
rate payers feel they ought to be able to declare how their money should in part be
spent for environmental protection. Citizens feel they have the right to judge the
environmental impact caused by extraction of their mineral resources..The list of those
major corporations for which the public if fast developing new definitions of corporate
responsibility reads like an industrial "Who's Who".
In the future less and less will any institution be able to decide unilaterally what
its particular public should have. More and more, the corporate task will be to determine
what its particular public wants and then to do it. In the case of public utilities, that is
another way of asking: What is the public willing to pay for? Utility obligation then will
more and more involve a complete disclosure of facts, and less and less will it involve
passing judgement on those facts.
26
The relationship between unilateral decision-making by utilities and patterns of
public political resistance toward proposed nuclear power plants and the siting of these
facilities has been studied by David G. Jopling and Stephen J. Gage of the University of
Texas. The results of their study of the patterns of resistance towards the Enrico Fermi
proposal, Lagoona. Beach, Michigan; Pacific Gas and Electric proposal, Bodega Bay,
California; Consolidated Edison proposal, Cayuga Lake, New York; and Northern States
Power proposal, Monticello, Minnesota, clearly show that the resistance towards this
additional generating capacity could have been reduced if not completely eliminated if
these utilities had only involved those interested segments of the public in their
pre-decision planning process.
Therefore, if a new approach to the siting and development of future generating
facilities is to be designed which will prevent undue delays in their construction and
operation, then open planning and participative decision-making must be an integral part
of this problem-solving mechanism.
What is open planning, who should participate in this process, and where should it
fit into the total systematic process of technological, ecological and sociological planning?
These are difficult questions for which there is no single right answer, but a variety of
possibilities. The open planning approach is dependent on the time available for
this process, the geographic area, the public credibility of the utility in question, the
nature and attitude of the critics involved, and the degree of openness and flexibility of
alternatives available to the participants.
Simply defined, open planning is a process which actively seeks outside inputs,
ideas, evaluations-and participative decision-making utilizes open planning as a means of
determining the needs of the public. The important words in this definition are
"actively" and "public"; and the success or failure of the process is dependent on the
quantity and quality of active public participation.
The greatest difficulty an institution will encounter when entering the realm of
open planning is the determination of who is the public with which it should work. When
seeking an answer to this question the following suggestions may be helpful:
1) "Public" and "government" are, of course, not synonymous. One cannot rely
only on the regulations and standards of federal, state, or local authorities as a
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means for determining public needs.
2) The "general public" or a balanced cross section of the public is not the
"public" of interest in this process either. The active, involved and concerned
public are partisan groups and these groups will unavoidably involve critics,
who would at first sight, seem to complicate the planning process.
3) Particular individuals should not be sought out, but rather representatives
suggested by organizations.
4) Relying solely on consultants, no matter how concerned towards the
environment they may be, should not be construed as open planning. This
method will only increase problems of credibility for both the institutions and
the consultants involved, because lacking the backing of partisan groups they
can be more easily suspected of subservience to the power industry.
5) No matter how radical, unrealistic or unqualified certain spokesmen for
different points of view may appear to be, they should be allowed to express
their point of view and participate in the debate.
If a corporation decides to utilize an open planning forum it should work with
the public in the pre-decision stage. Initiating this process after major decisions have been
made immediately places the company in a defensive posture, and a generally
unproductive (for all concerned) advocate/adversary environment will prevail.
Yale economist Charles E. Lindblom has pointed out repeatedly (e.g., in his "The
Intelligence of Democracy-Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment", 1965) that
good decisions are those based on consensus. This does not mean that the power, industry
must accept the endless .delays that might be involved in reconciling the interests and
values of conflicting groups with diametrically opposed points of view. But the process of
open planning does often expose the unreasonable position of extremists and rallies the
majority in support of a sensible problem-solving solution (see Section 3.2).
Furthermore, the systems engineer and other systems analysts are not necessarily
experts at determining by themselves what interests a:nd values may impinge upon the
I
system with which they are concerned. Other skills, .those of the social sciences, are
required to identify and weigh such values and interests operative at that particular time
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in that particular community. The results of such inquiries, assuming that they would be
skillfully conducted, could nevertheless become the subject of considerable and possibly
bitter controversy. Their credibility would be hard to establish and defend.
By contrast, open planning would amount to an invitation to all such interests
and values to "stand up and be counted", to make themselves heard in a public forum,
open to the scrutiny of all other partisan groups. The accusation that certain interests or
values had been ignored or suppressed could no longer be voiced after the open planning
process had taken place.
Thfl systems engineer would gain from such a process the knowledge that would
permit him to experiment with alternative solutions, based on a range of assumptions in
which different values and interests could be ordered according to different hierarchies of
priorities. Such alternative models could then become the basis of more sophisticated
cost-benefit analyses, which might show that the cost of taking into account certain
"external" (i.e., non-economic) factors would be a reasonable price to pay for wider
community support.
The major obstacle to such an effort is distrust, and the corporation must work
long, hard and patiently to overcome this obstacle (not only distrust by the
environmental community, but also the distrust that exists within the corporation itself).
The whole process must be based on an implicit faith in the rational man. Once this
distrust is overcome (if this is possible), the problems assume an entirely new scope.
Open planning is at mQst an experiment and at best a transitional forum which
will be replaced in the future by new open planning forums where citizens groups and
corporations will work with government in a semi-formal gathering, but hopefully not in
a hearing format. Hearings require predetermined positions and tend to stifle flexibility
and cooperative planning. If open planning fails, the advocate-adversary approach of
public/governmental hearings are necessary, but it should not be looked upon as the only
means to an end-especially when the objective is public involvement in planning
processes.
Corporate involvement in these processes demands considerable commitment to
the philosophy of open planning. It will be necessary to experiment until a method is
formulated which fits the needs of the period and the problem. These needs will change
constantly and the process must be flexible enough to change with these needs. The risks
are high, but the benefits will be the lack of delays and new insights pertaining to
problem-solving alternatives.
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2.3 Recommendations
Consultation with state and public groups should begin long before public
resistance to the proposal is openly voiced. The utility company should pull the public
into the planning and decision process for plants, including the design, siting and
construction activities. The company should abandon any traditional public relations
policy that emphasizes corporate anonymity and should establish a wide range of
unobstructed and flexible communication channels with the general public.
A utility should make both formal and informal efforts to incorporate the public
into the decision processes. Formally, the company should actively lobby for the creation
of a broadly representative task force, either at a state or regional level, to advise the
utility's long-range planning staff on the siting of all electric power facilities (fossil-fueled,
nuclear-fueled, hydro, pumped storage, etc.). The company should also establish a
permanent environmental affairs division with interdisciplinary capabilities for liaison with
regulatory agencies and environmental groups.
If the creation of a formal advisory body is not possible, the company should
continue to seek public participation by inviting relevant state agencies and environmental
groups to inspect plant sites and to reconcile differences over what constitutes the best
site alternatives. In a further effort to communicate with public groups over ecology
problems, the company, in cooperation with appropriate government agencies, should
hold numerous workshops and public hearings on the plant proposal but with ample
notice being given to arty public groups and individuals who have expressed an interest.
The company should specifically invite potentially important groups that do not appear
on their own initiative.
The format for public hearings should include a request for each state and public
group to present what it regards as the important history and potential uses of each
alternative siting locale. These hearings should present government, environmental and
public representatives with a clear picture of what operating experience shows can be
expected from the proposed plant. At no time during these hearings should the company
or any of its representatives withhold relevant material of a technical, economic, or
political nature, unless such material is truly proprietary in nature. The utility should be
prepared to emphasize compromise very early if difficuJties arise over siting alternatives.
Once an accord has been reached with public groups, however, the utility company
should call upon the state and public groups that contributed to the accord to support
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the siting agreement that has been reached.
In some cases it will be impossible to conVInce certain environmental groups or
concerned individuals to participate openly in such public forums, yet their input is
desirable. If such instances arise, private briefing sessions should be offered in order to
seek their reaction to utility proposals. Every possible effort should be made to work
with these people.
At times it will also become necessary to negotiate not only on the alternatives of
new proposals, but on alterations to existing facilities. A willingness to "up-date" past
decisions could easily make or break future open planning activities.
There are ways for the electric power utility to avoid escalating the environmental
credibility gap. But clearly no easy solution will be forthcoming for this problem
Foreseeable developments in reactor technology cannot completely mitigate the possible
release of radioactive materials nor do they offer much hope for significantly reducing
thermal effects. Significant developments in gaseous emissions control for fossil fueled
plants are also not within easy reach. A constantly changing societal value system
presents the utility with a moving target of public expectations. In conclusion, the
electric power utility must recognize that only resolution, not solution, of power plant
siting is possible; that political processes based on a continued working out of differences
is the reality to be expected.
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3. Case Studies of Conflict and Resolution
3.1 Introduction
As emphasized in Section 2, no general theory exists that would lead to a
systematic procedure for the resolution of conflicts over power plant siting.
Environmental and aesthetic factors vary widely with locality and type of power plant,
and they are also changing with time. In this situation a set of druggist's prescriptions for
every ailment might do the patients more harm than good. A more constructive approach
is to describe pathways toward conflict resolution; here actual case studies can be helpful.
The lesson to be learned from these case studies is that each utility will have to devise
procedures best suited to its particular situation. These procedures may involve
negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, mediation or combinations of these methods. The
dominant theme is that full, continuing disclosure of all relevant facts by the utility is
essential from the point at which the necessity for a new power plant is established clear
through design, construction and operation. In this manner public interest groups have an
opportunity to develop and define the issues. The earlier these issues are defined the
easier it is to devise an appropriate procedure for the resolution of conflicts.
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3.2 Northern States Power Company (Minnesota)
In many areas in the United States there are presently no effective mechanisms
for determining environmental factors and taking them into account when considering
sites for power plants. Where such mechanisms are either absent or ineffective, it
behooves the power company to devise its own mechanism An example of one
mechanism developed by a power company is the Citizens Advisory Task Force created
by Northern States Power Company. NSP had four available sites for future development
at the time it was determined that future generating capacity would be needed by that
utility by 1976. This utility found it appropriate to establish a Task Force composed of
representatives from local environmental groups in order to determine which one of these
sites should be selected for its 1976 unit-a 680 MW(e), fossil fueled power plant.
NSP announced in January 1970 that siting and development of all future plants
and transmission lines would be discussed, in advance of decision-making, with the public.
To implement this decision NSP went to every major (and some minor)
environmental/conservation groups in Minnesota-perhaps some 30 groups. Many of these
had been and still are locked in bitter controversy with this utility. Some were small
groups, ad hoc groups, others were well established large groups. Each group was asked to
send representatives to a Plant Siting Task Force being formed by NSP. The company
tried to convey the seriousness with which they were approaching this effort and they
asked these groups to send people capable of making the intellectual commitment and
willing to make the commitment of time. Not one group refused to participate, although
many were hesitant, fearing all of this was just a public relations facade and they would
be used by the Company to their disadvantage. But they took the risk and the Task
Force was formed with approximately 40 members. During this period much time was
spent by utility representatives discussing the whole idea with editorial writers, reporters
and opinion leaders.
The Governor of Minnesota had earlier formed an Environmental Cabinet
consisting of state department heads (Department of Natural Resources, Economic
Development, Pollution Control Agency, etc.). NSP invited participation of the
Governor's Environmental Cabinet and they also accepted
These two groups together with NSP started weekly meetings In March, 1970.
Their initial assignment was twofold; first, to make a recommendation to the Company
on the location of its next generating station scheduled for service in 1976. The
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constriction of time required that a recommendation be limited to four sites which the
Company already owned. Their second assignment, after completing the first, was to look
at the long-range problems of plant siting (including transmission lines) in a totally
unrestricted way, and hopefully to develop environmental criteria which the Company
could apply in the acquisition and utilization of future sites.
The initial meetings were marked by great suspicion and hostility on the part of
everyone. Each week NSP-and in some cases the state-eame to take their "lumps". It
was "sackcloth-time" and in the eyes of some NSP people it was a futile exerCise m
masochism. The group included almost every major critic of the Company.
The initial meetings were devoted to a series of presentations intended to bring
everyone up to some minimum level of common understanding about the nature of the
electric utility business. Whenever possible the Company used consultants, people from
the University of Minnesota and other non-NSP experts in the hope of enhancing
credibility.
Along about the sixth week, something very significant happened. The group itself
turned upon one of the more outspoken critics, and in effect told him to shut up, that
they felt they had a chance to do something constructive and that the constant hostility
expressed by this one man was getting in the way. From that point on the dynamics of
the group began to change.
NSP also learned very early that if a company is to convene a group of this kind,
it is impossible to try to limit the areas of discussion. Soon they were discussing things
like advertising and marketing policy and expenditures, research, rates and rate structure,
validity of demand projections-things that had never been discussed in a public setting
and which produced much anxiety for many within the Company. All meetings were
open to the public and the press was invited-there were no secret meetings. At least one
officer of the Company was present at every meeting. The initial meetings were kicked
off by the Chairman of the Board, and he attended other meetings intermittently-all in
an effort to express the seriousness of corporate intent. This kind of demonstration is
vital because such an effort has great credibility problems with the environmental
community.
After a time, the Governor's Environmental Cabinet began to withdraw from the
meetings with the Citizens Group, until soon NSP was faced with two separate groups
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meeting independently of each other. The burdens of staffing these two groups were
severe. Any such effort demands complete and total support from all segments of the
corporation if it is to succeed. If a company cannot get that, it should not try it. Phase
one-that is, the effort to reach a recommendation on the location of the next generating
unit-resulted in two reports: one from the Citizens Group, and one from the Governor's
Cabinet. It did not surprise the pessimists that each report recommended a different
location. The Governor's Group recommended a site that had been the Company's first
choice initially. NSP had made their own preference clear to the Task Force at the
beginning. After a great deal of internal agonizing, the Company elected to follow the
recommendations of the Citizens Group. While the reason for that decision is complex, it
basically stemmed from the feeling that the rationale presented by the Citizens Group
was sounder.
The Citizens Group, through a process of elimination, selected what they felt was
the "least of four evils"-the Monticello site near an existing nuclear plant. They
eliminated the other sites for the following reasons:
1) King Site: This site is located on the lower St. Croix River, which is presently
being evaluated by the U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation for inclusion in the
Federal Wild and Scenic Rivers System. The St. Croix is one of the most
valuable recreational and open space resources in the Minneapolis metropolitan
area, and the Task Force did not want another power plant along its shores,
even though it would be located next to an existing unit.
2) Carver Rapids: This location in the Minnesota River Valley was the only
undeveloped site of the four. NSP had recently purchased this site and it was
the most desirable from the company's point of view because it had sufficient
land to develop a large cooling pond. The Task Force had ruled it out because
the site and adjacent properties were being proposed as a state park, and part
of the Minnesota Valley Trail will bisect it. The future use and development of
the Minnesota River Valley was the subject of considerable public and
legislative controversy. The Task Force believed that the building of even a
single power plant on this site would commit the area to industrial use and
could preclude any long-range study of alternative uses.
3) Prairie Island: There are two 550 MW' nuclear plants presently being
constructed on this site. The effects of their thermal and radioactive discharges
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on the environment would not have been known in time to be included in the
planning for the emission controls for a 1976 fossil fueled plant; therefore, the
Task Force rejected this site for lack of environmental information.
4) Monticello: The remaining site, Monticello, is primarily poor agricultural land,
and several years of environmental and ecological monitoring studies for the
nearby nuclear plant have been completed. Through this process of elimination,
which centered primarily around land use considerations, the Task Force
selected the Monticello Site.
The Task Force continued to meet at a rigorous pace, strengthened by NSP's
decision and their belief that this Company is really listening. It has divided itself (by its
own choice) into four study groups, each of which will make recommendations to the
full Task Force. These four groups are looking at: 1) environmental monitoring programs
and research; 2) identification of future plant sites; 3) development and utilization of
those future sites; 4) the whole question of future energy demands.
The Task Force mechanism seems to have been effective in this particular plant
siting case. A continuation of this process beyond this siting effort will have many
obstacles to overcome which could greatly affect the structure and operation of this
group in the future. A major negative force acting on this type of volunteer forum is
attrition. At the beginning open planning requires a tremendous commitment of time and
intellectual involvement on the part of the volunteers who usually have other interests
besides the environmental impact of power production proposals. In addition, the major
interests of the group convened to help a utility to site and develop power generation
and transmission facilities might change to an area of concern which the utility is not as
willing to discuss e.g., energy policy and growth. Therefore, power companies will
probably find it necessary to change from one mechanism to another from time to time
in conjunction with the dynamic properties of conflict over plant siting, energy
production and energy consumption. Rigid forums of the past should be re-structured to
reflect the needs and dynamics of present and future interactions.
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3.3 Consumers Power Co. (Michigan) and Yankee Atomic Power (Vermont)
At the heart of NSP's novel experiment was the concept of full and continuing
disclosure of plans from the point of determining required new capacity through the
design and operational stages. For the most part this concept may prove more basic to
facilitating long-range planning, construction and operation of major facilities than
soliciting public participation in the actual planning process.
Given ideal procedures for making public policy with fully responsive and
responsible public servants, there would be little cause for public alarm concerning the
generation of electric power. The present concern, on the other hand, is partly due to
poor planning, the absence of appropriate regulations and the sudden awareness of a
dramatic rate of growth within the industry. Bearing this in mind, it is reasonable to
expect that until effective njechanisms are devised to facilitate timely and orderly growth,
and until the technology exists or is employed to meet society's limits of acceptable
environmental impact, social forces beyond those codified by traditional means
(governmental agencIes, etc.) will continue to bear on problems of power plant siting and
construction.
In the case of the Palisades nuclear reactor of the Consumers Power Company on
the southeastern shore of Lake Michigan, citizen groups did not actively participate in the
planning process. But in the end CPC's response to the social forces bearing on the
operation of the plant is quite similar to NSP's.
CPC applied to the AEC for a construction permit for its Palisades plant in 1966.
eonstructio~ proceeded with little organized opposition until 1970 when epe applied for
an operating license from the AEC. Several citizens organizations appeared on the scene
at this point.
The AEe hearings disclosed mounting public OpposItIOn to the thermal and
radioactive wastes of present and future plants all around the Great Lakes. Anticipating
intolerable operational delay, CPC engaged in the co-operative exercise of negotiations.
After several months of negotiations CPC agreed:
(1) to install evaporative cooling towers that' were closed-cycle except for
cleansing of lake water residues from the towers
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(2) to install the latest and most sophisticated containment equipment to
eliminate emissions of radioactive wastes.
The agreement is to be enforced by AEC. By this agreement AEC assumes the
responsibility of regulating both thermal and radioactive emissions to the agreed upon
levels.
The Palisades controversy-quite clearly an adversary process-has had a
revolutionary effect on the AEC licensing procedures. The AEC now agrees it is bound to
consider environmental effects from other sources than radioactivity when licensing
future facilities. In addition, the Palisades agreement sets minimum standards acceptable
for all nuclear power plants on fresh water lakes.
The situation any utility finds itself in IS essentially unpredictable, as CPC
discovered. Opposition came years after initial design and construction stages. The point
here is that future engineering and corporate decision-making must be conducted in the
context of paradigm change (Section 1.3).
If one can offer any guidance it must by necessity be cautionary rather than
prescriptive. Utilities must not attempt to define the public or to set its policies to fixed
goals-this is a political and social process that defies analysis in the context of
immediately realizable technological alternatives.
Yankee Atomic Power exemplifies this tendency to judge the community
narrowly. To facilitate proceedings on an application for a license to operate its Vernon,
V1. nuclear plant, YanRee Atomic sought to define the "public" and bind it by
agreement to set issues. The public, however, cannot be defined and while Yankee
Atomic may succeed in locking one segment of the public into a "reasonable" posture
for purposes of debate, more than likely a dissident faction will intervene and seek
judicial review at a later date, further delaying construction and conceivably altering
actual design considerations.
The situation illustrates how well-intentioned decision-making and discussion
backfires if it begins after the fact-that is, after the substantive engineering and
corporate decisions have already been made.
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3.4 Commonwealth Edison (Illinois)
Just as Consumers Power Company found that design specifications are not
sacrosanct, Commonwealth Edison (Illinois) found that even standards, insofar as they
embody long-term goals for a specific program of pollution abatement, are subject to
sudden change if the public decides against the traditional approaches to setting
standards.
Ideally, standards should be set by a rational process based on a clear
understanding of the mechanisms to be controlled and with a well-defined and generally
agreed-upon set of objectives in view. (See Section 5). But the situation is clearly not
ideal owing to rapidly changing prioritieE> and goals.
Commonwealth Edison, which had been seeking an AEC operating license for its
Dresden 3 nuclear power plant in Grundy County, Ill., found it necessary to compromise
because of intervention on the part of public interest and environmental groups.
The citizens groups intervened before the AEC on the premise that
Commonwealth Edison had not complied with recommendations made by the Division of
Environmental Radiation, U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) in a review of Dresden 3, as
required by the National Environmental Policy Act. The prime recommendation of the
PHS was that the radioactive waste system proposed for Dresden 3 be improved to
reduce the emissions of radioactive gases.
Although a federal judge had earlier ruled that the state of Minnesota could not
legally set emissions standards below those of the federal government, Commonwealth
Edison privately agreed to write new standards that provide that Dresden 3, along with
Dresden 2 at the same site, emit only 1.5 percent of the radiation that the AEC would
have allowed under its own regulations. The public interest groups in turn agreed to drop
their intervention.
42
3.5 Southern California Edison Co. (Huntington Beach, California)
In order to meet the growing demand for electrical energy in Southern California,
the Southern California Edison Co. proposed in 1969 to expand its existing steam power
plant at Huntington Beach, California, from a capacity of 880 MW(e) to a total of 2460
MW(e) in three units. After reviewing this proposal, the Orange County Air Pollution
Control District determined that such an expansion would increase the daily burden of
oxides of nitrogen and particulate emissions in the airshed under its jurisdiction by an
unacceptable amount. The APCD, therefore, opposed the application of the utility. The
State Public Utilities Commission, on the other hand, approved the application. The case
is now awaiting the decision of the State Supreme Court.
This jurisdictional conflict arises because under the state constitution the PUC has
ultimate licensing authority over privately owned electric power utilities. State law,
however, grants responsibility for setting and enforcing air quality standards to the
Orange County APCD*.
Superficially it would appear that Southern California Edison was caught between
two competing jurisdictions. Actually the utility chose a narrow interpretation of the
public interest rather than a broad interpretation. As an example of an alternative
procedure, an agreement could have been negotiated with the APCD to derate the plant
when ambient NOx pollutant concentration exceeded a certain level.
But whatever the options available at the time, the situation confirms the
experience of utilities elsewhere (most notable the cases of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power vs. Los Angeles APCD and Consolidated Edison's controversial Astoria
plant) that conflicting jurisdiction is a signal of the ever-expanding nature of regulation.
If they are to fulfill their obligation to the public, power utilities must therefore be
responsive to changing social priorities by seeking as broad and as open a determination
of the public interest as possible.
In the long run it is probably In the interest of electric utilities as well as the
public to expose jurisdictional conflicts and to work toward their resolution. Their failure
to do so can only contribute to the growing public animosity toward the industry and
delay the construction of needed power generation capacity.
*While the final draft of this report was in preparation the State Supreme Court ruled
unanimously in favor of the Orange County APCD.
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3.6 Alternative Sites of Electric Generating Capacity for California
3.6.1 The Coming Conflict Over New Coastal Sites for Nuclear Power Plants in California
In Sections 3.2-3.5 we discussed conflicts over power plant siting that have
erupted in the recent past, and have either been resolved, or are (hopefully) in the
process of being resolved. Now we turn our attention to a conflict that lies just
ahead-the siting of nuclear power plants at new, remote locations along the California
coast. The major private and public electric utilities in California are attracted to these
sites for the following main reasons:
(1) difficulties experienced in meeting air quality standards on S02' NOx and
particulate emissions with fossil-fuel plants located close to urban load centers;
(2) stringent new air quality standards on large coal-fired inland plants in New
Mexico, Nevada, Arizona and Utah,* court suits against these plants by
environmentalists, and environmental impact studies by the Department of the
Interior;
(3) remoteness of these coastal sites from high-density population zones, as
required by radiation criteria in event of "accidents";
(4) access to "unlimited" supply of once-through cooling water;
SCE has announced its intention of building a new, large nuclear power plant at
Point Conception (about 40 miles west of Santa Barbara), and Pacific Gas and Electric
Company is examining sites for large nuclear power plants at Davenport (about 10 miles
N.W. of Santa Cruz), and at Point Arena in Mendocino County. Some environmentalists
see a vision (nightmare?) of a whole series of nuclear power plants sited along the
California coast in the next 10-20 years at all of the most beautiful and remote
wilderness locations. Thus the drive toward the coast by the electric power utilities is on
a collision course with the leading environmentalists and other public interest groups. For
example, in its proposed State Power Facilities Siting Council Act (1971) the Sierra Club
states:
*Desert power plants now in operation are located at Fruitland, N.M. (2150 MW(e)) and
Mohave, Nevada (1600 MW(e)). Page, Arizona (2300 MW(e)) is under construction and Kaiparowits,
Utah (6000 MW(e)) is in the planning stage. Original plans by a consortium of 23 Southwest utilities
(Western Energy Supply and Transmission Associates) called for a total of 36,000 MW(e).
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"The coast of California is an area of unique value to all the people of
California. No power plants or transmission line facilities shall be built in
the coastal zone wherever it is presently free of the encroachment of major
industrial, commercial or residential development."
Here we have an almost "classical" case of a failure on the part of the major electric
utilities to involve the public interest groups in meaningful planning operations and in the
search for viable alternatives (if any) right from the outset. The approach used so far is
to announce the possible new site locations and then to solicit the "reactions" of citizen
groups. However, it is certainly not too late to experiment with various mechanisms of
conflict resolution. In the following sub-sections we discuss briefly only a few possible
alternatives to new coastal sites for nuclear power plants. The objective here is not to
offer a set of technological "fixes", but to show how a useful discussion could be opened
up between the major electric power companies, members of the legislative and executive
branches of State government, and interested citizen groups. No one can possibly predict
the outcome of such a discussion, but the outcome might well be preferable to the
impending conflict over coastal siting.
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3.6.2 Southern California
3.6.2.1 Expansion at Site of Existing Nuclear Plant
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric are already well along
with their planned expansion of the nuclear facility at San Onofre (near San Clemente)
by 2300MW(e) by 1976. The question naturally arises as to a second expansion at or
below San Onofre. Such an expansion [say, by an additional 2300MW(e)] would require
agreement by the appropriate Federal agencies for the use of land presently included in
the Camp Pendleton (U.S. Marine) area. The city of Oceanside (population about 40,000)
lies about 14 miles below San Onofre, so no difficulty would be experienced with the
AEC population zone criteria on that score. Planning would have to include preservation
and even enlargement of the present beach area. (The new units might have to be located
on the inland side of Interstate 5).
Open planning or other mechanisms might also lead to a significant change in the
method of waste heat disposal utilized at this site. Present thermal discharge practice
employs a small number of large outfalls located near the surface. Large heated ocean
surface areas are produced downstream of the outfalls, and most of the waste heat is
transported to the atmosphere by radiation and convection. An alternative method has
been employed previously by Dr. Norman Brooks of Caltech to inhibit and even prevent
the effluent discharged from sewage water plants from rising to the surface. Dr. Brooks
designed a series of multiport diffusers that discharge out to sea under the thermocline.
As the effluent (or warm water in our case) rises, it mixes with the surrounding denser
fluid, gradually loses its buoyancy, and eventually reaches a "stable depth". By proper
design almost any desired dilution ratio and stable depth can be achieved. Multiport
diffusers for handling thermal power plant discharges would probably have to be arranged
at various depths in a vertical array in order to entrain the volume fluxes of ocean mixing
water that are required to bring the excess temperature down to a small value (say, 1
degree Fahrenheit).
Another method is to reach out farther and deeper into the ocean for cooler
intake water, so that the difference between discharge water temperature and ambient
water temperature is reduced. Conceivably, the nutrients contained in the discharge water,
when properly oxygenated by mixing with surface water, could form the basis of a sizeable
local sea food industry.
The objective of these two alternative methods is to avoid local "hot spots."
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3.6.2.2 Use of Municipal and/or Industrial Waste Water for Evaporative Cooling at an
Inland Site
Because of the scarcity of water of the required quality in the inland areas of the
Southwest, imaginative schemes for the reuse of waste water need to be developed. A
number of interesting possibilities are opening up because of the current drive in the U.S.
to provide secondary (and even tertiary) treatment of waste water. In Las Vegas, Nevada
a fossil-fuel electric power plant is utilizing treated municipal waste water in evaporative
cooling towers. A proposal for the large-scale use of treated waste water for evaporative
cooling in Northern Central Texas (Dallas-Ft. Worth area) is now under consideration by
a group of electric utilities.
The logic behind this development for the Southwest is easy to understand.
Modern urban areas in the U.S. utilize water for all purposes at the rate of about 200
gallons per day per capita. About one-half of this amount, or 100 gallons/day/capita,
could be recovered and reused, corresponding to a latent heat of 220 kwh/day/capita.
But the use of electric power for all purposes amounts to about 20 kwh/day/capita, and
the corresponding waste heat rejection at the power plants at 30% overall efficiency is
about 47 kwh/day/capita. Thus we need to divert about 22% of the potential amount of
reuseable waste water to power plants using wet, evaporative cooling towers, if this water
is the sole source.
A major problem with the reuse of waste water is that most of the municipal waste
water is located in urban areas, whereas nuclear power plants must be located far from
regions of high population density. In some cases, it may be advantageous to pipe treated
municipal waste water from large urban areas near the ocean, such as Los Angeles, to
remote inland sites 100 miles away. An economic analysis is required to determine capital
and operation costs of such a scheme.
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3.6.2.3 Lake Powell Area and the Kaiparowits Plateau
Lake Powell (Utah) is a large, man-made lake 252 square miles in area that was
created by damming the Colorado River at Glen Canyon Dam. The attractiveness of this
water supply and the abundance of coal has already brought a coal-fired power plant to
Page, Arizona (just south of the southwest tip of Lake Powell), and a second fossil-fuel
plant is planned on the Kaiparowits Plateau north of the southwest tip of the lake. A
substantial fraction of the power generated at these plants is assigned to the Southern
California Edison Company and the San Diego Gas and Electric Company. However,
these plants, and the proposed expansion of the coal-fired Four Corners Plant in
northwest New Mexico, raise serious environmental problems that are presently the
subject of a year-long environmental impact study by the Department of the Interior.
This power complex, and the Black Mesa coal supply, are also being challenged by a
coalition of environmentalist groups, and the controversy is apparently headed for the
courts.
The question naturally arises: why not build a nuclear power plant of 6000MW(e)
capacity on the Plateau near the planned location of Kaiparowits? Such a plant would
require about 220 cubic feet/second of evaporative cooling water from· Lake Powell, or
about 100,000 acre-feet/year. This requirement should be compared with the capacity of
the lake, which is about 27,000,000 acre-feet. In fact, estimates of its capacity from
several different sources vary by about 1,000,000 acre feet!
Eventually a second nuclear power plant of similar capacity could be constructed
on the Plateau. These two nuclear plants plus the coal-fired plants at Page and
Kaiparowits would dissipate about 40,000 MW of rejected heat energy into the desert
atmosphere over an area of about 1000 square miles. By comparison about 90,000 MW
of thermal energy from all sources (1971) is dumped into the air above the L.A. basin
over a 1500 square mile area. Convective wind currents should keep the ambient
temperature rise down to a maximum of 2-3 Fahrenheit degrees.
A nuclear power plant located on the Kaiparowits Plateau would not be plagued
by air pollution problems, by huge, unsightly piles of coal and by coal supply and
transport problems. Because of its remote location, radiation standards for the
"maximum credible accident" should not be difficult to meet. If a second large nuclear
power plant were located in the same general area it might be possible to adopt Dr. Alvin
Weinberg's suggestion of a local fuel reprocessing plant servicing this "nuclear park", thus
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eliminating the problem of long-distance transportation of radioactive wastes from these
plants.
A very rough cost analysis of a nuclear power plant on the Kaiparowits Plateau
shows that the system costs (including transmission lines and substation) would be about
$500/KW(e), compared to about $360/KW(e) for a fossil-fuel plant on the Plateau. If this
increase of about 40% in capital costs is applied to the whole Southern California power
system the consumer would experience about a 7Y2% increase in electric power rates.
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3.6.2.4 Use of Dry Cooling Towers in the San Joaquin Valley
Experience with dry cooling towers for thermal power plants is minimal in the
U.S. However, in Western Europe a dry cooling tower has been built for a plant
as large as 120 MW(e) capacity. Until recently there was no reason to employ
this method of waste heat management in the U.S. Increasing controversy over the
environmental impact of coastal power plant sites may make certain inland sites look
much more attractive. In some of these areas, for example the lower (S.E.) end of the
San Joaquin Valley, "natural" water is scarce and municipal or industrial waste water
flow is not adequate for evaporative cooling of a large power plant.* Thus, if dry: cooling
towers for plants of 1000 MW(e) capacity (or larger) could be developed, certain inland
sites would be opened up that are now out of the question.
For large power plants the most attractive type of dry cooling tower is the
"indirect" or Heller system. In some respects, the Heller tower is like a gigantic
automobile radiator. The usual car radiator dissipates about 70 HP, or about 50 KW,
while the Heller towers would dissipate about 2000 MW for a 1000 MW(e) nuclear plant.
The factor of 40,000 in energy means a factor of 40,000 in radiator area (roughly), or a
factor of 200 in linear dimension.
One of the problems with the dry cooling tower is that the condenser discharge
water operates at much higher temperatures than in the case of once-through cooling, or
wet evaporative cooling. For example, summer temperatures of 100 degrees are
experienced in the San Joaquin valley, so the condenser discharge water would circulate
at a temperature of 150-160 degrees. Corresponding turbine back pressure would be at
least 15 em Hg, and the last stage of American steam turbines for power plants would
have to be redesigned to avoid excessive loss in turbine efficiency.
Overall costs will be higher than for the system employing wet evaporative
cooling. Nevertheless it would be worthwhile to explore this possibility in some detail for
a site near Bakersfield (about 100 miles from Los Angeles).
*Agricultural drainage water in the San Joaquin Valley is a possible source of water for wet
evaporative cooling towers.
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3.6.3 Northern California: The Sacramento Valley
At least one large power plant in Northern California, constructed by the
Sacramento Municipal Utilities District (SMUD) near that city, uses evaporative cooling
towers. The average annual water flow in the Sacramento River along a ISO-mile stretch
from Redding (below Shasta) to Sacramento is 10,000 cubic ft/sec., and the flow rarely
drops below 8000 cubic ft/sec. Nuclear or fossil-fuel plants using evaporative cooling
towers could be located in the Sacramento Valley on both sides of the river. As
mentioned earlier, a 6000 MW(e) nuclear plant requires about 200 cubic feet/sec. of
evaporative cooling water-a small fraction of the Sacramento River flow. Of course,
water rights for this amount of water would have to be purchased through the California
Water Plan.
3.6.4 Off-shore Siting
Opposition to new coastal sites and increasingly difficult problems of land use and
waste heat management in inland areas make off-shore siting of nuclear power plants look
more and more attractive for the 1980's. In fact, recent public statements by Mr. Charles
Luce, chairman of Consolidated Edison of New York, and Mr. Elwood Eberle, president
of Public Service Electric & Gas Company of New Jersey, show that off-shor€ siting is an
idea whose time has come. The Special Projects Division of Westinghouse, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
is working independently on the concept of a barge-mounted nuclear reactor that would
float on the sea in about 200 feet of water about 2-3 miles off the northeast coast of the
U.S. This concept has the advantage of shipyard construction and standardization. During
the next 6-8 months the Caltech Environmental Quality Laboratory will conduct an
intensive feasibility study of several different concepts, with special reference to the
requirements of California.
51

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
ON POWER PLANT SITING

4. Economic Aspects 01Environmental Constraints on Power Plant Siting
In Section 1.2 we emphasized that providing for the energy needs of society and
minimizing adverse environmental effects must be co-equal objectives. In Section 1.3 we
emphasized that these twin objectives must be achieved at minimum cost; otherwise,
"agreements" between the electric power companies and the environmentalists are
achieved at everybody else's expense. At the same time, it is important to put "costs"
into proper perspective. Too often the phrase "too costly" has been a cover-up for
inertia. People are now quite rightly asking, "too costly compared with what?"
Obviously the economics of electric power plant siting under environmental
constraints is a very complex subject, involving energy costs as a percentage of
manufacturing or living costs, price-elasticity of electric power demand, substitution of
other, competing forms of energy that create more (or less) pollution per KW, etc. The
situation is not made any easier by the absence of any meaningful cost-benefit analysis (if
such an analysis is even possible). In spite of these difficulties it might be helpful to
examine a specific example of the impact of environmental constraints on electric power
costs to the consumer.
Suppose that after considerable study an electric power company and a citizens
advisory task force jointly decide that a new power plant should be located some 300
miles from the load center, and must use evaporative cooling towers. Roughly speaking,
the increased capital costs over costs for a plant near the load center using once-through
cooling are as follows:
1000 MW(e)
Item
Evaporative Cooling Towers
300 Mile Transmission Line
at $150K/Mi. (500KV-A.C.)
Sub-Station (Additional)
Totals
Capital Cost
(1971 Dollars)
$20-$25 M
$45 M
$20-$25 M
$85-$95 M
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% of Plant Cost
8-10
18
8-10
34%-38%
% of System
Capital Cost
5-6+
11+
5-6+
21%-24%
In this example the basic plant capital cost is taken as $250/KW(e), and the system
capital cost, including plant, transmission and distribution, is taken as $400/KW(e).
In addition, increased operating costs will be incurred because of power required
for pumps and mechanical draft, slightly reduced turbine efficiency, etc; these cost
increases are estimated at roughly 12%.
Now what is the impact of these increased costs on electric power rates to the
consumer? A typical breakdown of one dollar's worth of electric power delivered to the
customer is as follows:
Fuel and purchased power 20i} 241l productionOther production expenses 4Ii
Transmission 41l} 111lDistribution U
Customer accounts, sales,
administrative and general lIe
Dividends lU}Depreciation l 3U capitalInterest on debt lOll
Re-invested in business* 4e
Taxes lU
100e
By applying the appropriate factors to the increased capital and operating costs
for the new power plant we obtain the following results:
Capital Costs:
Operating Costs:
(21%-24%) x 0.37
12% x 0.24
TOTAL
=
=
8%-9%
3%
11%-12%
Thus the increased cost to the consumer is around 12%, or about 2.6 mills/KW hr. at a
residential rate of 2.2 cents/KW hr.
*Actually an additional 3% is retained, but these funds come from "other income," such as
interest charged to construction.
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A typical yearly cost of electricity for a "standard" home is about $125, or about
1% of median family income in California. For all manufacturing, the energy bill amounts
to an average of about 3.5% of manufacturing costs, whereas in certain specialized
industries the energy costs are 10%, and in non-ferrous metals as much as 25% of
manufacturing costs. For commercial customers the electric power bill is only a few
percent of total business expenses, including rent and labor. Thus, one strongly suspects
that electric power demand is "price-inelastic" and "income-elastic", except for certain
important special cases.
Of course the problem IS not quite this simple, because rIsmg fuel costs are
contributing to increases in power bills at the same time, and some of these increased
costs are attributable to environmental constraints. Nevertheless, the increased electric
power costs directly attributable to power plant siting and waste heat management do
not appear to be excessive.
Clearly, this complex question needs to be studied much more carefully, and
separately for each specific case, including relative fuel costs of uranium and fossil-fuels.
comparisons between various siting alternatives, impact of rate increases on low income
groups, relation between demand and the rate structure, etc.
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TRENDS IN REGULATION AND STANDARDS
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5. Trends in Regulation and Standards
The electric power industry has been a regulated industry for a very long time.
Originally the regulation was concerned mostly with safety, rate setting, and corporate
structure. More recently, regulation has been increasingly concerned with reducing adverse
environmental impacts, and the amount of that regulation is increasing rapidly. This
increasing regulation, coming at a time of rapidly increasing power demand, is having a
disruptive effect on the electric power industry. This section considers some aspects of
regulation, particularly environmental regulation, and suggests an approach to minimize
disruption while permitting the development of urgently needed environmental control.
There are definite signs that the system of regulation is developing in the direction
suggested.
Standards are the basic tool of regulation. They embody the criteria of
performance with which a regulated industry must comply. Ideally, standards should be
set by a rational process based on a clear understanding of the mechanisms to be
controlled, and with a well-defined and generally agreed-upon set of objectives in view.
Once set, the standards should change slowly if at all, and then only in an orderly and
deliberate way. To facilitate the wide applicability of specific technology, it is very
desirable that the standards be applicable to a wide geographical area, the whole United
States if possible. Safety standards and technical standards tend to approach the ideal
rather more closely than some other kinds of standards.
In the specific case of environmental control, the customary approach to setting
standards is being abandoned for what appear to be three related reasons:
1) a large part of the public is alarmed by the deterioration in the environment
and is unwilling to await good understanding in an area that is very difficult to
understand very well;
2) long experience with air and water quality standards, while satisfactory in some
areas, has been disastrous in others because of the lack of enforcement and/or
compliance;
3) the public realizes that once a power plant has been built it is very difficult to
do anything fundamental to it and essentially impossible to remove it if it
turns out to have been a mistake.
61
Behind these three reasons there is an intuitive feeling that we are in a situation
of such rapid growth and change that it may never be possible to set standards by any
rational process based on any reasonable degree of understanding of the mechanisms of
environmental damage. Because of this feeling, the public is resorting to the political
process to set standards rather than to the traditional processes, and to the courts to
enforce them (if necessary) rather than to the traditional regulatory agencies.
Recognizing the current use of the political process and the courts,· many people
In the electric power industry are appealing for a return to "rationality" in setting
standards and in regulation. This appeal misses the point that the public has decided
against the traditional approach. The problem now is to learn how to provide needed
power within this new set of constraints. One part of a solution to this problem is
addressed in Section 2. Another part having to do with standards and regulations per se is
addressed below.
One important point that must be recognized In trying to cope with
environmental standards is that these standards are being used for several quite different
purposes. One purpose is to embody long-term goals. A reasonable expression of a proper
long-term goal for air quality is that air should not contain any man-made pollutant at a
level which would be injurious to health or welfare. A similar statement can be made
concerning water quality goals. Such a statement does not mean that the air or water
might not contain some level of man-made pollutants. The actual level which should not
be exceeded in order to meet the goals is set forth in an ambient air (or water) quality
standard. (The term used here to describe the several kinds of standards is somewhat
arbitrary, but is in general consistent with legal usage and usage in the literature.) Such a
standard is set to reflect the best understanding of the effects of pollutants on man's
health or welfare, including effects on plants, animals, and property. They will change as
our understanding changes and, in case of doubt, are more, rather than less, stringent.
Considerations of technical or economic feasibility do not enter into the setting of this
class of standard. The situation here is somewhat analogous to the setting of standards
for adequate human nutrition which are based on considerations of human health and
well-being but are known to be unattainable for a large proportion of the earth's
population. It should be noted that such ambient air or water quality standards are
generally applicable nation-wide, since they apply to people, not the situation in which
they are living.
A second kind of standard embodies short-term regional goals. These standards
have been termed management standards and are interim standards which embody
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technologically and economically achievable levels of ambient air or water quality. They
are typically set to embody the goals for a specific program of pollution abatement
within a well-defined geographical region selected because its air or water resources are
best managed as a unit. As such, they have associated with them definite dates for
attainment. To the extent that they fall short of the ambient air quality standards they
are subject to revision as new programs of abatement based on new technological and
economIC resources are devised. New ambient air or water quality standards may· also
trigger the setting of new management standards. The key factor in management
standards is that they are intended to be realistic compromises between environmental,
economic and technological forces and attainable at a designated time.
The third kind of standards are emission standards. These are standards whieh are
set to establish permissible levels of pollutants in emissions from the various sources of
pollutants. Ideally, emission standards should be set on a regional basis as part of the
same program that sets management standards for that region. At present the delegation
of authority for setting emission standards is different in different states, and the Federal
government has preempted some of the authority. However, except for motor vehicles,
there is a definite trend toward setting emission standards on a regional, rather than state,
national or local level.
An important kind of interaction between the management standards and the
emission standards involves the measurement of the actual air or water quality. The idea
is that if the actual air or water quality improves in some respects, the stringency of the
corresponding emission standards can be relaxed, and conversely, if the actual air or
water quality worsens, the emission standards can be tightened. This kind of interaction
is particularly effective in handling seasonal variations. An outstanding example is the
regulations in Los Angeles that permit the burning of oil in power plants during certain
seasons but require natural gas (or low sulfur fuel oil) in others. The system that
regulates the use of the Ruhr River in carrying away wastes is similar even though it uses
a scheme of fees rather than prohibitions as a control mechanism. It should be noted in
passing that a properly designed system of air or water use fees is an effective method of
"internalizing costs" as well as controlling ambient air or water quality. Such fees may
often be a more effective and faster method of control than prohibitions. They are also
more flexible and conducive to necessary experimentation. Under proper administration
they cannot be considered a "license to pollute".
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A particularly painful interaction between management and emission standards
occurs in cases where currently achievable emission standards result in unacceptable levels
of pollutants under specified conditions. One example is the problem of waste water
discharge into a stream or river under drought conditions, when the flow rate is much
lower than normal. In this case all or part of the discharge is diverted to an empondment
or canal until stream or river flow rates return to normal. In extreme cases plant
operations may have to be curtailed or even suspended. Another example is the
occurrence of low inversion layers or stagnant air conditions in urban areas. An effective
"smog alert" based on strict adherence to management air quality standards would
involve limitations on the use of automobiles and the "de-rating", or even closing, of
power plants and industrial sources of pollution until atmospheric conditions improve.
There are, of course, exceptions to the structure of standards described here, and
there will always be exceptions even if this scheme becomes well understood and widely
adopted. Some of these will be in response to public pressure. For example, if the public
feels that an industry is too large and powerful to be responsive to local authorities, there
may be instances of state or even national emission standards. Indeed, we already see
some of these. Nevertheless, it is to the advantage of the public and to the power
industry to have a system of standards like the one described above rather than national
emission standards, in most cases. There is, however, a natural relationship between
national, state, and local standards that is compatible with the structure of standards
described. It seems quite appropriate that the federal government set overall ambient air
and water quality standards. The states, either singly or, when required, in concert, set up
the general programs of establishing air and water regional authorities with the
responsibility for establishing both management and emission standards. In some cases the
states would be permitted to set more stringent standards (but not less stringent
standards) than the Federal government. Each level is subject to review by the higher
level or levels which coordinate the efforts of lower levels and stand ready to provide
technical assistance or even take over faltering programs. Such an approach appears to
assure the most rapid possible abatement of pollution for the country as a whole, and for
each region as well.
This approach is not simplistic, and for that reason will be somewhat difficult to
explain and justify to the public. The power industrie.s can help in the process, but only
if the public is convinced that they have a full commitment to pollution abatement, and
are not trying to use a complex system to avoid doing their very best. It will be in the
best interests of the power companies in the long run to have a hand in setting standards,
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and to have the standards set considering technical and economic feasibility. To that end
it behooves the power companies to in fact do their very best in abating pollution and to
be perfectly open about their difficulties and limitations as well as accomplishments.
They should never be in the position of hiding behind an emission standard when the
actual air or water quality fails to meet the ambient air or water quality standards.
Although there are definite indications that the United States is developing a
workable system for assuring air and water quality along the lines described here, there
are other areas of public concern related to power plant design and siting for which no
effective system for considering the public interest appears to be developing. Among the
more important of these areas are land use and resource use and allocation. For example,
much of the opposition to specific power plants has been concerned with land use rather
than emissions. Although there is a great deal of legislation pending about land use,
especially along shorelines, there is no indication of an overall system for handling the
general problem of land use.
The situation with respect to the allocation and use of natural resources,
particularly energy resources, is perhaps even less developed than for land use. Certainly
the availability of fuels of various kinds has a major effect on the design and siting of
power plants. In a given situation, the use of a particular fuel might make the difference
between acceptability and unacceptability for power plants. Yet no method presently
exists for allocating fuels among various users in any general way. It seems inevitable that
the public interest will demand some better method than the present laissez faire method,
but none appears to be evolving.
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6. Unresolved Problems of Development and Research
6.1 Need for the Development of New Technology
Increasingly stringent standards of aIr and water quality and increasing public
concern over possible radiation hazards connected with nuclear power production. are
driving the electric power industry to seek new technology to control or minimize the
adverse effects of electric power generation on the environment. However, this search for
new technology is severely hampered by the fact that the public and private power
companies usually do not carry out their own research and development. Traditionally,
they write the specifications and rely on the equipment and component suppliers to
perform the research and development required to meet these specifications. Because
there are literally thousands of utilities in the U.S., and many equipment or component
suppliers, the whole development effort is fragmented. Unlike the communications
industry, there is no equivalent of the Bell Telephone Laboratories. or Western Electric.
Although the system for creating new technology utilized by the electric power
generation industry may have worked reasonably well in the past, it is becoming
increasingly evident that it is wholly inadequate to meet the unprecedented demands of
the 1970's and 1980's. To be more specific, consider briefly five main areas in which the
development of new technology is essential if growing energy demands are to be met, at
the same time that adverse environmental effects are minimized: (1) Reduction of adverse
effects of fossil-fuel plants on air quality; (2) Development of beneficial uses of waste
heat; (3) Reduction or elimination of radiation hazards; (4) Development of new energy
sources; (5) Development of novel methods of power plant siting.
(1) Air quality:
The three major pollutants emitted from fossil-fuel burning power plants are
oxides of sulfur, particulates and oxides of nitrogen. Without minimizing the importance
of the last two pollutants, the most serious problem nation-wide is the suppression of
sulfur oxide emissions. Obviously, there are two possible paths towards the solution of
this problem: (a) treatment of stack gases, (b) use of "zero-sulfur" or "low-sulfur" fuels,
or fuel processing to remove the sulfur content of ordinary fuels before combustion.
Attempts to remove the oxides of sulfur from the stack gases by means of alkali
"scrubbers" or by catalytic oxidation have not been too successful. The large volumes of
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stack gases and the low final concentrations of oxides of sulfur presently required make
these processes inherently difficult. The problem is not made any easier by the fact that
emissions standards are bound to become even more stringent in the future in order to
meet management air quality standards in urban air basins.
Supplies of low-sulfur fuel oils are falling behind demand and prices are nsmg
rapidly. In many cases it is becoming potentially more attractive to remove the sulfur
from ordinary fuel oil before it is burned. A similar process can be used with coal, but
substantial removal of the sulfur is difficult because of the physical and chemical
structure of coal. This difficulty can be overcome if the coal is converted to a liquid or
gaseous form. This approach has the additional advantage of reducing the magnitude of
the particulate emissions problem by discarding the solid ash before burning.
The work of the Coal Research Board has resulted in a process for the
liquefaction and desulfurization of coal, and a consortium of large oil companies is
building a pilot plant for Dynaelectron Corporation's Hydrocarbon Research,
Incorporated. The major gas companies, through the Institute of Gas Technology, are
operating small pilot plants for the hydrogassification of coal. However, in remarks
delivered recently at the NAE-COPPS Forum, Dr. Osborne, Director of the U.S. Bureau
of Mines, estimated a date of "1980" for the first large scale production of desulfurized
fuel by either of these processes! This time-table is incompatible with the urgent needs of
the electric power industry and is ridiculously slow for an industry with a gross income
of at least $20 billion in 1970.
Natural gas, or methane, is the "zero-sulfur" fuel utilized for many years by power
plants in Southern California. The growing demand for methane all over the U.S. and the
static or declining supply creates a need for conversion of other, more plentiful
hydrocarbons to methane. Coal is one possibility, but another source that might be
developed more quickly is the light fraction of petroleum with boiling points below the
boiling point of gasoline. The process is feasible on a small scale, but here again
large-scale development work is urgently needed.
The whole question of fuel conversion has implications that go far beyond the
needs of the electric power industry. The demand of the U.S. for oil for all purposes .is
increasing at the rate of about 5% per year. Domest~c production will fall farther and
farther behind requirements over the next 20 years, ! even if the best estimates of the
Alaskan reserves are included in the forecast. On the other hand U.S. coal reserves are
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estimated at about 400 years supply at current production rates, so the converSIOn of
coal to liquid (or gaseous) hydrocarbons may become competitive with oil imports as the
price of imported oil rises steeply. Coal conversion may maintain a competitive advantage
even when the costs of giving proper attention to the preservation of topsoil and the
restoration of the land are included in the cost of coal mining operations.
(2) Beneficial uses of waste heat:
If cold deep ocean water is utilized for power plant cooling, the nutrients brought
up from the depths and then discharged back into the ocean at the surface could be
employed as the basis for a new industry called "mariculture". Experiments are being
carried out on the use of warm thermal discharge water for the biochemical treatment of
sewage waste water; the warm discharged water promotes the growth of algae, which
extract nitrates and phosphates from the waste water. The algae can be sold as protein
for animals. Many other examples of "aquaculture" would undoubtedly be developed,
and rather quickly, if there were a centralized development agency to promote this work.
(3) Radiation hazards:
Promising methods exist for the treatment of solid and liquid radionuclides at a
nuclear power plant that would virtually eliminate the necessity for discharging any of
these substances into the environment. If successful, these techniques would reduce the
discharge of radioactive substances by factors of 50-100.
Another problem that will become troublesome in 5-10 years is the discharge of
gaseous Krypton-85 from atomic fuel processing plants. By the use of liquid nitrogen
cold traps and activated _charcoal filters, Kr-85 could be liquefied, removed, and stored
under pressure (half-life is 11 years).
At present the AEC has the responsibility for some of these matters, but the
electric power generating industry "takes the heat" at public hearings and in the press.
The industry itself will have to take over the development effort in this area.
(4) New energy sources:
At present approximately $100 million/yr.. is being spent by the AEC on the
development of fast breeder reactors of various types, including the liquid sodium
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reactor. This sum is about one-half the amount being spent on the development of the
new U.S. Air Force B-1 bomber in its early phases.* It is hardly surprising that the
estimated date for the practical utilization of the FBR is 1985!
An infinitesimal amount of time and money is being devoted to the development
of practical means for the utilization of solar energy, including solar-heated homes,
photo-voltaic cells on a large scale and at competitive cost, etc. Yet the use of virtually
pollution-free solar energy is one of the very few ways that have been suggested to limit
or control man-made heating of urban atmospheres-a problem that will certainly require
attention in the post-1985 time period. Work on the development of geothermal power is
also proceeding on a rather leisurely time-scale, in spite of its obvious importance for
local regions of the West and Southwest U.S.
Fusion research seems to be progressing very well under the control of the AEC,
although this work could also be accelerated somewhat by doubling the current sum of
$25 million/yr. devoted to it.
(5) Novel methods of power plant siting:
The electrical power generation industry is already encountering severe difficulties
m obtaining new power plant sites, and these difficulties will be compounded as the
demand for electrical energy grows (Section 1.1). New methods of power plant siting will
have to be developed, including offshore floating or shallow-submerged nuclear power
plants (Section 7); siting on marginal agricultural land using piped-in, reclaimed waste
water for evaporative cooling, or "dry" cooling towers; long-distance transmission to load
centers using cooled low-resistance lines, etc.
*We are not taking any position for or against this new weapons system; we are merely drawing
useful comparisons.
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6.2 New Mechanisms for Development and Research
A large, integrated, and well-directed research and development effort will be
reqUIred in order to make certain that the more than 250 billion dollars that will be
invested in power generation equipment over the next twenty years will produce a power
generation system that meets the nation's need for electrical power and contributes to
the improvement of the environment. It must also insure that the development of new
fuel sources and treatment methods will serve the other major energy uses, for example
heating, manufacturing, and transportation, as well as electric power generation. Two
different paths could be followed in organizing such a large-scale development effort: (1)
establishment of a new Federal agency, which might be called the National Energy
Administration (NEA); and (2) establishment of a new energy development corporation
by a consortium of private (and public?) power companies.
The new Federal agency (NEA) would be an independent executive agency
established by an act of Congress. It would be similar to NASA in concept, but not
necessarily in structure. It would have to be given a clear mandate and an adequate
funding; the amount required could easily be provided by a very small tax on energy use.
At the present rate of consumption in the United States a tax of only a half mill per
kilowatt hour on electrical energy alone would produce more than three-quarters of a
billion dollars per year. A definite "life-time" for this new agency might be established of
(say) three years; each year the Congress and the President could review the work of the
NEA and decide if it should be continued for another three years, or phased out over the
next three years.
A number of political ohstacles would have to be overcome in order to bring the
NEA to life, and delays of 3-5 years in establishing such an agency would be costly. An
alternative procedure is to establish a private Energy Development Corporation (EDC)
under the control of a consortium of the large energy producers in the U.S. Possibly it
would begin with the electrical power generating industry, but the importance of natural
gas and desulfurized fuels would undoubtedly bring in other segments of the energy
industry. Legal problems and problems of including assessments for the EDC in the
public utility rate structure would arise, but do not appear to be insurmountable.
The need for new technology for power generation and fuel treatment is so great
that unless one of these two possible agencies is created, and soon, we are quite likely to
be both short of energy and living in a poorer environment in a very few years.
73

LONG-TERM PROSPECTS

7. Long-term Prospects
In the long term, say beyond 1990, the problems of power plant siting in the
United States will be somewhat different than for the more immediate future. The
problems then will probably be conditioned by three major factors: the population will
be substantially larger than now, the per capita consumption of power will be several
times as large as now, and the population will be more concentrated than now in both a
relative and an absolute sense. It appears that the population, and hence the electric
power load, will be concentrated along the east coast, the west coast, around the great
lakes, and along the gulf coast. In this situation the problems of power plant siting for
the plants which will supply most of the load will be similar to the problems for the
plants which now supply New York and Los Angeles. In these two areas there is already
a clear trend toward importing power from other areas, often a considerable distance
away.
Although it seems likely that the trend to remote siting of power plants will be
well developed by 1990, the criteria for selecting the remote sites will be somewhat
different for fossil fuel plants and for nuclear plants. The fossil fuel plants will need sites
that allow the transportation of fuel, mostly coal or a coal derivative; the disposition of
ash and possibly scrubber effluent, some means of cooling, and provision for transmission
lines to the load. If present trends continue, sites on bodies of water, including rivers
lakes, estuaries, and the ocean, and in wetlands will be unacceptable. This trend will force
the use of closed-cycle cooling and permit siting on marginal agricultural land. There
appears to be an adequate supply of such land, since a large power plant requires only
1000 to 3000 acres, so that even a hundred large plants would require only 300,000
acres out of some 300,000,000 acres of agricultural land. Moreover, we have a long-term
program of reducing the amount of agricultural land in production, and this program is
likely to continue. It seems reasonable that, with proper control of pollutants, the power
companies will have a large number of sites available to optimize the trade-offs between
fuel transportation, waste disposal, and transmission lines.
The natural supply of clean fuels like natural gas or light, sulfur-free oils is
becoming very limited. Indeed, the great supplies of fossil fuel energy in the
United States are in coal and oil shale. Neither of these is an ideal fuel. So far only coal
is used on a large scale, and its use leads to severe problems of fly ash and sulfur dioxide
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removal from the stack gases. It is becoming more evident that the desired approach to
the use of coal js a two-step process in which the coal is processed to produce a light
hydrocarbon for use as a fuel and the undesirable components never enter the
combustion process at the power plant (Section 6). The disposal of the undesirable
components is a problem; perhaps the best approach is to return them to the mine. If oil
shale is developed as an energy source it is likely that a two-step process will be the
natural approach. The undesirable component is even larger (the shale) than for coal and
the return of it to the mine seems an obvious approach.
The problems of siting a nuclear power plant are somewhat different than for a
fossil fuel plant. The whole problem of handling the fuel and disposing of the waste
products is not very dependent on the distances involved. For that reason the fuel
transportation and waste disposal drops out of consideration in choosing a site. The
transmission lines are just as important as for a fossil fueled plant in an absolute sense,
perhaps more so in a relative sense. Cooling is more important because of the lower
thermal efficiency. Safety is of paramount importance. Safety under normal operation is
not likely to be a problem. The standards for radioactive effluents are low and are going
down rapidly. In a few years they may well be so low that even operation in a high
population area would be acceptable.
Accident safety is another matter. There is great public trepidation about the
possibility of the accidental release of large amounts of radioactive materials. It appears
inevitable that large exclusion zones around each plant will be required in which there
will be permitted no permanent residents or commercial or business activity, and only
low density transient occupation. A further restriction on the siting of nuclear power
plants in the west coast area of the United States is the need to protect them from the
effects of earthquakes. Only certain geological area are suitable.
Given these factors, particularly the safety factors, an obvious location for nuclear
power plants is the deep water offshore in the oceans and in the middle of the larger of
the great lakes. This location would provide an essentially unlimited supply of cold water
for cooling, which could be discharged at a temperature at or below the surface ambient
to minimize the impact on the environment. In fact, the effect might be beneficial in
bringing nutrients to the nutrient-deficient surface waters. In many cases the length and
cost of transmission lines to the load centers would al~o be less. Of course, an exclusion
zone is automatically provided if the power plant is mo~e than twenty-five or thirty miles
offshore, and the deep water would effectively insulate a floating hull from earthquake
waves.
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The factors which make the deep water offshore an attractive location for nuclear
power plants may in some cases make it an attractive location for a fossil fuel burning
plant. For example, an oil-burning plant constructed in a floating hull forty miles from
the load center and using cold deep water for cooling might be more economical than the
same plant on land a hundred and fifty miles from the load center and using a
closed-cycle cooling system.
By the end of the century, the rising demand for energy in all forms will be
exerting great pressure on the supply of fossil fuels, and perhaps on nuclear fuels. This
pressure will lead to the use of other sources of energy, and this will in turn affect the
siting of power plants both directly and indirectly. If fusion power becomes available,
there will be a whole new set of problems in siting them but the problems will be
somewhat similar to those of siting nuclear power plants. because the fusion plants will
be large electrical generating plants which need only small amounts of fuel.
Another source of power that may become important in some areas is geothermal
energy. In this case the site for a power plant is pretty well fixed by the location at
which the energy is available. The problems in this case are likely to be cooling and the
disposal of the condensed steam. Usually, the source is tapped by withdrawing natural
steam and water. Typically, this water is loaded with minerals from contact with hot
volcanic rock and is a pollutant if indiscriminately dumped.
In the long run, unless something like nuclear fusion gives us essentially unlimited
power, the cost of electric power will rise as fuels, both fossil and nuclear, become in
shorter supply. It will then behoove us to conserve electric power (there are many who
think we are already in that circumstance). Even with an unlimited supply we will begin
to suffer local climatic changes because of the excess dissipated energy dumped into the
atmosphere over urban areas. The "thermal dome" over cities is already a well recognized
phenomenon. One way of limiting this thermal effect is by the use of solar energy,
particularly for low-grade uses such as water and space heating. A proper balance between
electric power and other forms of energy will ease the problem of power plant siting and
allow the power companies to provide the electric power our society really needs.
In summary, the large densely populated areas which will exist along the east
coast, the west coast, around the great lakes. and along the gulf coast after 1990 will
probably be supplied power by a combination of fossil power plants with closed-cycle
cooling located inland and nuclear power plants located in deep water offshore. As the
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processing of fossil fuels into light clean-burning hydrocarbons comes into widespread use
the fossil-fuel burning plants may also move offshore. In the long run it will be necessary
to supplement the generation of electric power from fossil fuels and nuclear fission by
other means of generation, e.g. by using geothermal energy or nuclear fusion. It will also
be necessary to supplement the use of electric power by other kinds of power,
particularly solar power for low grade uses such as water and space heating.
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Appendix A
From the Los Angeles Times of Wednesday, March 24, 1971
U.S. ACTS TO PREVENT LAKE MICHIGAN HEATING
by
Bryce Nelson
CHICAGO-The Nixon Administration's Environmental Protection Agency took its
strongest stand to date against heat pollution in the nation's waters by declaring that all
new power plants around Lake Michigan should have closed-cycle cooling systems using
cooling towers or other devices to prevent the discharge of heated water into the lake.
If the proposal is adopted by the four-state enforcement conference here, federal
authorities have said they will try to apply equally stringent standards to the other four
Great Lakes.
Federal officials also regard the statement as setting a precedent for nuclear power
plants scheduled for construction along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and along inland
lakes and streams.
Companies Critical
Power compames have been critical of proposals to build closed-cycle systems
because of the expense added by construction of the massive cooling towers. In large
bodies of water such as Lake Michigan, companies have also argued that there is no
evidence that thermal discharges adversely affect marine life.
"In the face of such unknowns", stated Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus, "we must choose the course of caution. For far
too long precautions against environmental damage have awaited a full understanding of
the threat.
"The march of progress has aggravated environmental damage while proposed
safeguards were under consideration or studies were being performed. In the case
of Lake Michigan, we cannot afford further delay." Ruckelhaus, who is not attending
the two-day conference, made the Administration statement by letter.
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The announcement of the new proposed federal standards drew the praIse of
conservationists present at the conference but drew criticism from some of the
representatives of the states, including serious questions from the Illinois conferee. Two
federal commissions, the Federal Power Commission and the Atomic Energy Commission,
also expressed reservations about parts of the plan.
Wisconsin Gov. Patrick Lucey, a Democrat, however, wired the conference that he
supported the Administration plan to require cooling towers for nuclear plants.
If the representatives of the four states adjoining Michigan (Illinois, Wisconsin,
Indiana, and Michigan) refuse to agree with the new standards, Francis T. Mayo, Midwest
water quality coordinator for the EPA, said the agency was prepared to employ
administrative processes to achieve the standards. Such processes could include calling a
special standard-setting hearing or taking the states to court.
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